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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study was to create a brief strength of religious/nonreligious 
worldview scale that has language inclusive for nontheistic populations.  An exploratory 
factor analysis was conducted using 207 participants from a major public southwestern 
university and a public midwestern university in the United States.  It was determined 
that the Strength of Worldview Scale (SOWS) is a single-factor measure, which also 
demonstrated high test-retest reliability.  It was hypothesized that scores on the SOWS 
would be negatively correlated with the Depression, Stress, and Anxiety Scale (DASS), 
positively correlated with the Purpose in Life Subscale, and not correlated with the 
Extraversion Subscale of the Big Five Inventory (BFI).  Only a modest statistically 
significant correlation between the SOWS and Purpose in life was found.  A regression 
analysis was also conducted with theistic/atheistic belief as a predictor of scores on the 
SOWS.  A curvilinear relationship was found, indicating that strong theists and atheists 
score more highly in the SOWS than those who are unsure of their beliefs on the 
existence of a God, Gods, or Higher Power.  Preliminary results suggest that the SOWS 
may be a promising measure for assessing strength of belief in both theist and nontheist 
populations. 
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Review of Literature 
Religion has been, and continues to be, a central part of human culture for 
thousands of years, and for many individuals, it is a fundamental aspect of life and 
personal identity.  However there is a growing trend of individuals identifying as 
nonreligious throughout the world.  Atheists can be described as individuals who lack a 
belief in any God or supernatural higher power (Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011).  
It is estimated that there are close to half a billion individuals worldwide who do not 
believe in God (Zuckerman, 2007).  Nonbelievers in God comprise the fourth largest 
religious identity worldwide, behind Christians, Muslims, and Hindus (Gervais, 2011).  
Still, nonbelievers are an often underrepresented and sometimes discriminated minority 
in nearly every country in the world.  While in the United States atheists do not face such 
grave persecution as death or imprisonment for their belief, their experiences are unique 
to being irreligious in a religious nation and culture.  Atheists report experiencing 
psychological harm as a result of social and personal attitudes of others regarding their 
beliefs, but these factors are not well studied (Whitley, 2010).  The field of counseling 
serves to help those of diverse backgrounds through culturally sensitive research and 
practice.  There is currently insufficient research on the experiences of atheists in the 
counseling setting, especially in comparison to the extensive research on religious and 
spiritual populations.  This is in part due to inadequate measures to allow in-depth study 
of the nature of nonreligious beliefs.  In order to better assess the relationship between 
mental health and religious belief, this study aims to develop a measure of strength of 
belief that is applicable to individuals on the full spectrum of theistic-atheistic belief. 
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 In this review, I will first define religion and spirituality, as well as what it means 
to be an atheist or nonbeliever.   I will then describe the demographics of Atheism in the 
United States, and provide a short historical background for the persecution and 
discrimination against atheists.  Lastly I will summarize current literature on the 
relationship between religious belief and mental health, and examine relevant measures 
of religious belief as well as the issues in the measurement of atheists’ belief systems. 
Definitions of Religion and Spirituality 
 Although religiosity and spirituality are nearly universally salient constructs, there 
is some variety as to how they are defined, and they are difficult to measure (Hwang, 
Hammer, & Cragun, 2009).  Religiosity is commonly accepted as “ beliefs, practices, 
behaviors, and feelings that are expressed in institutional settings or ways associated with 
a denominational affiliation“ (Richards, Bartz, & O’Grady, 2009).   Spirituality is a more 
generalized construct, and is defined by the American Counseling Association as a 
“capacity and a tendency innate and unique to all persons…that moves the individual 
toward knowledge, love, meaning, peace, hope, transcendence, connectedness, 
compassion, wellness, and wholeness“ (Summit Results, 1995, p.30).  Simply put, 
spirituality is a “general feeling of closeness and connectedness to the sacred 
(Worthington, Hook, Davis, & McDaniel, 2010, p. 205).  While the definition of 
spirituality is vague enough to cover a myriad of individual beliefs, it is still worth 
keeping in mind that some individuals do not regard themselves as spiritual (Baker & 
Smith, 2009).  Many atheists do not identify as spiritual, even if they may engage in ways 
that can be interpreted by others as spiritual (Hwang, Hammer, & Cragun, 2009).  
Religiosity generally refers to an institutional context and spirituality with an 
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individualized one, and while there is often a great deal of overlap, they are not 
necessarily interconnected (Richards, Bartz, & O’Grady, 2009).   In fact, there is only a 
modest correlation between self-reports of religiosity and spirituality (Kapuscinski & 
Masters, 2010).  There exists a growing number of individuals who profess belief in a 
God, Gods or higher power yet are unaffiliated with any religion, just as there exists 
nonspiritual people who participate in religion for primarily social reasons (Baker & 
Smith, 2009; Sherkat, 2008).  While there are many ways to define religiosity and 
spirituality, these construct do not adequately encompass the belief systems of nontheists, 
who tend to view themselves outside of both religiosity and spirituality. 
Definition of Atheism 
Whereas theism represents individuals who believe in one or more omniscient, 
omnipresent, personal God or Gods (Cliteur, 2009), atheism represents individuals who 
do not believe in any God, Gods or higher power (Whitley, 2010).  It is worth noting that 
while most theists in the United States subscribe to monotheism (belief in a singular 
God), there is a minority population that believes in polytheism (belief in 2 or more 
Gods) or a more generalized and impersonal higher power (Cliteur, 2009).  For the 
purposes of this review, theistic beliefs may be represented by any combination of God, 
Gods, or higher power to represent the entire spectrum of theistic beliefs.  Similarly, 
while atheists are often considered a homogeneous group, there is not one set of beliefs to 
categorize these individuals.  There are common misunderstandings in the varied ways 
one can be a nontheist, such as confusion between agnosticism and theism.  Agnosticism 
is traditionally defined as an uncertainty about belief in the existence of a God or Gods, 
or a belief that we do not currently have the ability or knowledge to make a definitive 
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statement on the existence or nonexistence of God (Baker & Smith, 2009).  However, 
atheism and agnosticism are not necessarily separate constructs.  Both theism/atheism 
and gnosticism/agnosticism can be viewed as dimensions of belief and knowledge, 
respectively, where theism/atheism represents belief/nonbelief in a God or Gods, and 
Gnosticism/agnosticism represents possibility/impossibility of knowing the truth.  There 
can then be four combinations: agnostic atheist, gnostic theist, gnostic atheist, and 
agnostic theist. Due to the relatively recent surge in writings about atheism in popular 
culture (see for example, Hitchens (2007), Dawkins (2006)), there are many more terms 
in existence to describe the more nuanced dimensions of nonbelief.  For the purpose of 
clarity in this study, the term atheist will be used to refer to those who do not believe that 
any God exists, while the term nonbeliever will be used to describe the spectrum of 
nontheistic belief systems.   Both monotheists (belief in a singular God) and pantheists 
(belief in more than one God) will be referred to as theist and defined by their belief in at 
least one God. 
Beliefs of Atheists 
What it means to be an atheist or nonbeliever can be in many ways just diverse as 
what it might mean to be a Christian or a Muslim.  Without any holy texts or major 
centralizing organizations, nonbelievers tend to be very individualized in their belief 
systems.  However numerous atheist, secular, and humanist organizations, such as 
American Atheists, Atheist Alliance, and the American Humanist Association, have 
emerged in an attempt to centralize believers.  Beliefs tend to be structured around 
concepts of rationality, logic, and material existence, rather than the supernatural.  Still, 
supernatural beliefs are not necessarily excluded, as some atheists may believe in ghosts, 
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karma, aliens or other entities unobserved and unproven.  Atheists may have a myriad of 
varying ideas about the nature of our universe, but share the belief that there is no 
omniscient and omnipresent higher power.   Without a religion to explain purpose in life, 
atheists often turn inwards for explanation.  They believe that one’s meaning and purpose 
in life is the responsibility of the individual to develop.   An atheist believes that the 
natural world is all that exists, and without a belief in an afterlife, this life has innate 
value.   
 While religions often play a large role in the social expressions of their members’ 
lives, atheism does not have any dogmatic social teachings or requirements of how to 
express one’s belief; though prominent atheist individuals and organizations provide 
suggestions, such as alternatives to Christianity’s Ten Commandments (Dawkins, 2006).   
As a consequence atheism is not seen as a religious identity, but is more of a 
philosophical ideology similar in type to feminism, Marxism, etc.  A common stereotype 
of atheists is that since they do not believe in a higher power that has supreme authority 
to ensure that they act morally, they are more inclined to immoral behavior (D’Andrea & 
Sprenger, 2007).  From a religiously morally absolutist point of view, because atheists do 
not adhere to any religion’s moral code, they are viewed as immoral.  However, atheists 
have the same intrinsic emotions as theists and are driven to moral action just as naturally 
(Baggini, 2003).  Atheists subscribe to morality that is rooted in evolutionary or 
sociological bases.   From an evolutionary standpoint, humans have developed the ability 
to act rationally and behave in ways that will help sustain the species, which implies that 
moral decision-making is ingrained in our species (Dawkins, 2006).  The sociological 
perspective suggests that as a group, people determine what is moral over time within a 
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cultural perspective.  In both bases, religion is seen not as the originator of morality but 
as an expression of cultural and evolutionary morality.  
Atheism is seen as ideologically in contention with theism, causing a need for 
justifications of an atheistic worldview.  The theoretical justifications of contemporary 
atheism can be broken into scientific atheism and humanist atheism (LeDrew, 2012).   
Scientific atheism is the belief that scientific and technological advancement through 
utilization of the scientific method and rational thought are in conflict with religion and 
ultimately make religion and belief in a higher power obsolete.  Humanistic atheism takes 
the approach of viewing religion within a sociological and historical context, theorizing 
that without suffering and inequity there would be no need for religion.   Both theoretical 
aspects of atheism do not necessarily disprove the existence of a higher power, but 
merely demonstrate the foundations of a worldview are well developed.    
Demographics of Atheism 
In the United States, individuals who identify as atheist consist of about 4-5% of 
the population, though this number is likely low due to a number of reasons why 
someone would choose not to disclose his/her nonbelief (D’Andrea & Sprenger, 2007).   
In some fundamentalist theocratic nations atheists can be imprisoned or even killed, and 
while nothing of this magnitude exists in the US, discrimination and prejudice against 
atheists persists (Gervais et al., 2011).   An individual may choose not to identify as an 
atheist because of the stigma in such a highly religious nation as the US, instead choosing 
one less conflicting with religious ideology, such as questioning or agnostic.   Even in 
European countries such as France and Norway with a large population of nonbelievers, 
only a small percentage identify as atheist (Zuckerman, 2007).  People may also hold a 
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personal belief of atheism, but identify with a religious organization of upbringing for 
social or cultural reasons (Baker & Smith, 2009).   For example it is common for a 
Jewish individual to identify with the religion of Judaism, but yet not believe in the 
existence of God, especially in comparison with Christianity, where faith in God is a 
more central tenet of affiliation with the religion (Sherkat, 2008).   
While atheists may be an underrepresented population, the number of people 
identifying as atheist is growing worldwide.  However, the percentage of atheists varies 
highly from country to country and region to region.  Nations where there are higher rates 
of general public welfare and security tend to also have the highest rates of nonbelievers, 
and conversely nations that are poorer or have less societal welfare tend to be highly 
religious (Zuckerman, 2007).  There are anomalies, such as developed nations (U.S., 
Ireland) that are highly religious, and nations with poor development and security that are 
irreligious (North Korea, former Soviet states).  The marked trend in increased 
secularization over the last few decades has for the most part been limited to the more 
developed nations, such Canada, Australia, Japan, Korea, and much of Europe, while less 
developed nations have not become more secular.  Although many individuals in these 
secularized countries may profess a lack of belief in any God, it appears many do not 
wish to be identified as atheist.  For example, 31-44% of the British reported not 
believing in God, though only 8% reported identifying as an atheist (Zuckerman, 2007).   
In the United States, atheists tend to follow certain demographic trends.  In a 
country where religious conservatism has become strongly associated with political 
conservatism, atheism is much more frequent among the politically liberal (Sherkat, 
2008).  According to one study, of those who identify as atheist, 77% are male and 59% 
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are under the age of 49.  Atheists also tended to be more, educated and wealthier than the 
general population (Hwang, Hammer, & Cragun, 2011).   Although most atheists have no 
affiliation with a religious organization, a small number (2.6%) of atheists identify with a 
particular religion (Sherkat, 2008).  Atheists are considered more likely to be more 
“independent, introverted, lonelier, undogmatic and tolerant of ambiguity…” and yet 
show no differences with religious individuals in traits such as “likelihood of performing 
an altruistic act, emotional disturbance, depression, self-esteem, dispositional optimism, 
and social support” (Hwang, Hammer & Cragun, 2009, pg. 613). 
Discrimination Against Atheists 
Atheists have historically been an underrepresented and discriminated population, 
both worldwide and in the US.   Skeptics of the supernatural have pondered their 
existence since antiquity. Protagoras, recognized as the earliest prominent philosopher to 
be contemporarily considered an atheist, was eventually condemned to death for his 
writings.  In ancient Greece, atheism was used primarily as a label to attack opponents, 
though it was unheard of for an individual to self-identify as an atheist at that time 
(Bremmer, 2007).  It was not until the 18th century in France that Atheism became used 
as a term for self-identification, though agnosticism remained a safer and more popular 
label to express a disbelief in theism (Hyman, 2006).  With increasing modernity in the 
western world at the turn of the 20th century, atheism became more accepted as a cultural 
phenomenon. 
Persecution of atheists was not uncommon throughout history.  The penalty for 
apostasy was often death or imprisonment in many historical cultures, including those of 
medieval Europe (Bremmer, 2007).   Severe punishments for atheism however still exist 
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in some Islamic nations in Africa and the Middle East.  Seven countries currently still 
have a death penalty for apostasy and atheism, and while there have not been many 
executions in recent history, the existence of such laws point to extreme prejudice in 
some parts of the world towards the irreligious (Evans, 2012).  Atheists may not have to 
risk their lives to express their beliefs in the United States, but that does not mean that 
discrimination here does not exist.  Federally, the United States protects the rights of 
atheists to hold public office, though seven state constitutions still have laws preventing 
atheists from holding public office (State Constitutions that Discriminate against 
Atheists, n.d.). 
Even without much institutional discrimination in the United States, atheists still 
face widespread and often open prejudice for their beliefs.   In a study investigating 
discriminatory experiences of atheists, forty-one percent of self-reported atheists 
recounted experiencing discrimination within the last half decade (Hwang, Hammer, & 
Cragun, 2009).  Multiple studies and polls support that atheists are viewed as one of the 
most distrusted groups in America (Edgell, Gerteis, & Hartmann, 2006; Gervais, 2011; 
Gervais, Shariff & Norenzayan, 2011).  Amongst various hypothetical (and equally 
qualified) minority presidential candidates, the atheist was the only one that a majority of 
respondents would be unwilling to vote for (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2011).   Atheists 
were also the minority category that Americans would least approve of their children 
marrying (Edgell, Gerteis & Hartmann, 2006).  Respondents of another survey reported 
that atheists received lowest priority for receiving a hypothetical donated organ, 
suggesting that people believe atheists are less deserving of a second chance in life 
(D’Andrea & Sprenger, 2007).  In news and popular media outlets, atheists have been 
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criticized and stereotyped in line with the general prejudice towards atheism (Johnson, 
2012).   The general stereotype of an atheist is a person who does not act morally, 
worships the devil, is angry towards God, is confused, and rude (D’Andrea & Sprenger, 
2007).    
One interpretation for the cause of this prejudice and distrust of religious 
individuals towards atheists is that atheists are believed to lack a higher authority for 
morality (Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011).  Because atheists act without fear of 
supernatural monitoring or punishment, they are seen as a threat to act uncooperatively 
with society.  Almost half of Americans responded that they view it is impossible to act 
morally outside of God, so it is no surprise that those responding would express distrust 
and the resulting prejudice towards atheists (Edgell, Gerteis, & Hartmann, 2006).   It 
would seem that the degree of distrust of atheists correlates with an individual’s belief 
that belief in God is a requirement for moral behavior.  A study by Gervais, Shariff, and 
Norenzayan (2011) investigated this claim, and discovered that distrust of atheists is 
generalized in society, even amongst spiritual individuals who did not actively participate 
in religion.   
Not surprisingly, negative attitudes towards atheists have the potential to 
contribute to psychological distress.   Religiosity and spirituality have been well studied 
in regard to mental health and well-being, although atheism and well-being is relatively 
unexamined (Weber, Paragment, Kunik, Lomax II, & Stanley, 2011).  While connections 
have been made to religiosity and positive mental health, to imply the inverse that lack of 
religiosity is psychologically harmful would be erroneous (Morgan, 2013).  Weber et al. 
(2011) conducted a meta-analysis of studies comparing nonbelievers (atheists and 
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agnostics) with believers (in God) in terms of psychological distress.  The findings from 
10 studies were mixed, suggesting inconclusive or marginal overall differences in degree 
of distress between believers and non-believers.  Some of the studies in the meta-analysis 
suggest that strength of belief, whether it is atheistic or religious, moderated the 
relationship between belief/nonbelief and psychological health.  That is to say, 
individuals who believed strongly in their atheism were just as psychologically fit as their 
theistic counterparts, provided they had a similarly levels of doubt in their belief system.   
However, a common experience among newfound atheists is that their beliefs are 
temporary or “just a phase,” potentially making it difficult for atheist to develop similar 
levels of conviction in his/her worldview to utilize it as a tool for coping.  These findings, 
as well as the findings on negative attitudes towards nonbelievers may help explain 
potential factors for psychological distress of atheists.   
The distress that nonbelievers experience has been linked to social isolation and 
internalizing negative attitudes (Edgell, Gerteis, & Hartmann, 2006; Jenks, 1986).   Also, 
whereas religious individuals may find comfort from the social aspect of religion, most 
atheists do not have such an organization to connect with others who share a similar 
belief system.  One study indicated that self-reported atheists were more likely to report 
experiencing discrimination than those who held private beliefs in line with atheism but 
chose not to identify as such (Cragun, Kosmin, Keysar, Hammer, & Nielsen, 2012).  A 
similar study by Swan and Heesacker (2012) found no significant differences in negative 
perceptions towards an individual labeled as an atheist and an individual whose beliefs 
would categorize him/her as an atheist.  This suggests that the only effective method for 
nonbelievers in God to avoid negative perceptions is by hiding their beliefs from others 
	  	  
 	   12 
and refusing to identify publicly as an atheist.  Similarly, minorities of other identity 
categories who are more outspoken about their identity are more likely to experience 
prejudicial attitudes as they are perceived as a threat to the status quo (Kaiser & Pratt-
Hyatt, 2009).   
There are indications that prejudice in atheists can be reduced.  Atheist prejudice 
is far less common where atheists are more prevalent, and it has been experimentally 
shown that reminders of atheist prevalence reduced prejudicial attitudes towards atheists 
among religious individuals (Gervais, 2011).  On an individual level, Garneau (2013) 
investigated the relationship between mental health and perceived prejudice towards 
atheists.  Individuals who perceived greater prejudice towards their atheism were more 
likely to report psychological distress.  Some common attempts to manage the perceived 
prejudice, such as being secretive about one’s beliefs and trying to “pass” as a non-atheist 
were shown to correlated with greater distress, whereas having a large network of other 
atheist friends was correlated to lesser distress.  For an atheist wishing to manage 
negative prejudicial attitudes, he/she is faced with a seeming catch-22 – identify publicly 
as secular in order to gain the benefit of a social support network but face more prejudice 
from others, or conceal one’s beliefs to reduce prejudice but face inner conflict from 
having to hide one’s true beliefs.  In addition, remaining closeted about one’s beliefs does 
not protect from internalizing prejudicial attitudes towards atheists. 
Atheism as a Diversity Issue in Counseling  
Psychotherapy has historically been a secular institution.  Sigmund Freud likened 
religious belief to an illusion, and it was perhaps in his mold that the field of psychology 
and psychiatry was secularized (Whitley, 2010). In recent decades religion and 
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spirituality have been integrated into therapy as a way to connect to the diverse 
experiences and worldview of clients.  Still, there remains a drastic gap between the 
secular nature of the profession and the majority religious clients it serves.  Additionally, 
the experiences of atheists in therapy are understudied in comparison religious and 
spiritual individuals. 
Psychologists are much more likely to be nontheistic than the general public.  
Whereas over 90% of Americans are theists, only 30-40% of therapists are estimated to 
believe in God (Whitley, 2010).   A survey of psychologists indicated that they were 
markedly less likely to view religion as something important in their lives, compared to 
the general public (Post & Wade, 2009).   According to a Gallup poll, two-thirds of 
Americans would prefer to be treated by someone who has similar spiritual beliefs 
(Young, Wiggins-Fame, & Cashwell, 2007), suggesting a potential issue of a 
spiritual/religious “mismatch”.  Despite this difference, it is the responsibility of the 
therapist to be competent in working within a client’s worldview, especially since a 
therapist will almost always differ with the client in some key identity category, whether 
it is race/ethnicity, sexual preference, socioeconomic status, etc.   Attention has been 
given to ensuring that therapists can maintain this competence.  The Association of 
Spiritual, Ethical, and Religious Values in Counseling (ASERVIC) is a group within the 
American Counseling Association maintains a specific list of competencies deemed 
essential for implementing religion and spirituality in therapy (ASERVIC, 2009).  Still, in 
one study only 46% of counselor educators in CACREP approved programs felt prepared 
to include these competencies, and only 60% of counseling students in these programs 
reported exposure to spiritual competencies (Young, Wiggin-Fame, Cashwell, & Belaire, 
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2002).  It would seem that the counseling profession has identified a greater need to train 
its future therapists to deal with issues relating to religion and spirituality.  One study 
indicated that mental health professionals were more likely to view the beliefs of less 
common religions, such as Mormonism or Nation of Islam, as pathological in comparison 
to Christianity, even when the beliefs are not identified as belonging to the particular 
religion (O’Connor & Vandenberg, 2005).   This study is concerning in that it suggests 
unfamiliarity with diverse beliefs may be harmful to therapy.   
Atheism is a topic that is rarely mentioned when integrating religion and 
spirituality in counseling.   The counseling profession prides itself on embracing the 
diversity of its practitioners and its clients, and being able to treat clients equitably and 
fully.   This is true regardless of the counselor’s own beliefs and values, as both the 
American Counseling Association and the American Psychological Association mandate 
that practitioners must not let personal bias take precedence over their clients’ 
worldviews (ACA, 2005; APA, 2010).  For the most part, counseling has embraced 
multiculturalism, which D’Andrea and Sprenger (2007) define as empowerment of 
marginalized groups in society, yet atheists and have been conspicuously absent in the 
research on multicultural counseling.  Atheists comprise a small (5-10%) percentage of 
Americans, similar to other minority groups who already receive attention in 
multicultural counseling literature.  As an underrepresented population, atheists have 
similarities to the LGBT community, and parallels can be drawn.  Much like LGBT 
individuals, externally adopting a marginalized label and “coming out” as atheist can be a 
potentially empowering and liberating step in the development of personal identity 
(Smith, 2011).  However, both atheists and the LGBT face prejudice for their identities, 
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and may choose instead to conceal their marginalized identity from others to avoid 
judgment, thereby experiencing similar pressures and challenges to explore in therapy.   
Religiosity and Mental Health 
 The connection between religious belief and mental health has been well studied 
in psychological literature (Bergin, 1983; Galen & Kloet, 2011; Hill & Paragment, 2003; 
Weber et al., 2012).  Religious belief has been associated with greater physical health, 
mental health, coping, and life satisfaction, and more specifically less depressive 
symptoms, anxiety, and suicide (McCullough, 1999; Koenig, McCullough, & Larson, 
2001; Plante, Yancey, Sherman, & Guertin, 2000; Weber et al, 2012).  The literature in 
support of the positive relationship between religiosity and life satisfaction is based on a 
meta-analysis using cross-cultural and multi-national sampling, suggesting a robust 
relationship (Okulicz-Kozaryn, 2010).  While many of these studies indicate positive 
correlations between religious belief and mental health, some evidence is unclear or 
contradictory with respect to a positive linear relationship (Galen & Kloet, 2011).   The 
relationship between religiosity and mental health appears to be more complex since 
there have not been studies to successfully find a causal relationship between increased 
religiosity and mental health.  Within the Vulnerability-Stress Model, the resources, both 
social and personal, that an individual finds with belief and practice in a religion may act 
as a coping tool for life challenges (Zwingmann, Klein, & Büssing, 2011).  The effect of 
religious belief could potentially be the result of mediating variables, such as certainty of 
belief or social support (Galen & Kloet, 2011; Weber et al., 2012).  Strength and 
centrality of religious faith (or nonreligious belief) has been linked to greater 
psychological health for religious individuals through greater coping (Baker & 
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Cruickshank, 2009; Wilkinson & Coleman, 2010).  It would seem that certainty in one’s 
beliefs and importance of those beliefs could moderate the relationship between belief 
and psychological well-being, even regardless of the content of belief (Galen & Kloet, 
2011).  Social support from religious belief may also moderate the relationship, and since 
the participation of atheists and other non-religious individuals in secular organizations 
has not been well studied, the effect is currently not clear.  Still, in studies that chose to 
examine the moderating effect of certainty of belief for both the religious and 
nonreligious (Galen & Kloet, 2011; Wilkinson & Coleman 2010), only a one-item un-
validated measure was used, and there was no exploration of the construct of nonreligious 
belief as independent from religious belief. 
While not a new hypothesis, there is increasing evidence that the relationship 
between religious belief and mental health is curvilinear, in part due to the effects of 
moderator variables (McMordie, 1981, Galen & Kloet, 2011, Weber et al., 2012).  In a 
study by McMordie (1981), individuals who identified as highly religious or non/anti-
religious had lower reported scores of death anxiety than those who fell in the middle.  
When distinctions are made in studies between the weakly religious and the nonreligious, 
a curvilinear relationship tends to appear, suggesting that it may be only the weakly 
religious who bear the brunt of negative psychological pressures (Galen & Kloet, 2011).   
However, most studies relating mental health and religious belief do not distinguish 
between the weakly religious and the nonreligious, creating the false presumption that 
there is a linear relationship and that nonbelief is inherently unbeneficial.  Those studies 
that do examine the nonreligious as a diverse group often do not adequately account for 
the potential moderator variables such as certainty of belief or social support.  Since most 
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studies of religious belief use a representative sample (90% theistic), they do not have a 
large enough sample of nonreligious individuals to detect variance in the beliefs of 
nonreligious individuals (Galen & Kloet, 2011).  This lack of variance in the beliefs of 
the nonreligious is in large part due to the inadequacy of religious measures in terms of 
measuring the beliefs of nonreligious individuals the same way that religious individuals’ 
beliefs are measured.  Due to the discrepancy in defining religious belief and spirituality, 
many measures exist that differ in measuring the construct of religiosity (Freiheit, 
Sonstegard, Schmitt, & Vye, 2006).  Each of the following measures is a popular tool for 
measuring religious belief in psychological study, yet each contains flaws that render 
them inadequate for the study of atheists in relation to mental health. 
Measures of Religiosity 
 In the field of psychology, religion has been a well-studied phenomenon over the 
past 20 years, with close to 8,000 peer-reviewed related articles containing “religi*” 
(stem word search) in the PsycINFO database.  Despite this attention, there is no 
consensus about how to measure religiosity, in part due to the difficulty in defining and 
operationalizing relevant constructs.   Hill and Hood (1999) compiled 125 
multidimensional measures of religious and spiritual belief with the desire to better 
understand the complex nature of religious and spiritual belief.   From the compiled 
measures of religiosity, Hill and Paragment (2008) identified some unifying constructs 
shared by the varying measures: closeness to God, Orienting and motivating forces, 
religious support, and religious and spiritual struggle.   Closeness to God can be 
characterized by experiencing a personal relationship with God; orienting and motivating 
forces are the underlying drives for religious and spiritual belief, such as for internal 
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fulfillment or external identification; religious support measures the connectedness of the 
individual to their religious community; and religious and spiritual struggle identifies the 
doubt and challenges associated with religious belief. 
 The most prevalent concept in the study of religion and psychology has been 
religious orientation, driven by the development of the Religious Orientation Scale by 
Allport and Ross (See Allport & Ross, 1967; Hill & Hood, 1999).  Underlying drives and 
motivations were a focal point in understanding what motivates people’s religious beliefs 
in relation to prejudice, and from that point the Religious Orientation Scale has been the 
theoretical basis of many popular religious orientation scales.  The following measures 
are popular (well cited in the literature), influential, and they possess robust psychometric 
properties (Hill & Hood, 1999; Hill & Paragment, 2008; King & Crowther, 2004).  
However, a commonality shared by these measures is an absence of attention to the belief 
systems of nontheists. 
Religious Orientation Scale (ROS).  Allport and Ross conducted perhaps the 
most impactful research on the measurement of religious belief, with the initial purpose 
to study the relationship of belief with ethnic prejudice (Allport & Ross, 1967).  In the 
development of the scale, religious belief was divided into two factors that described the 
motivating forces: Extrinsic Motivation and Intrinsic Motivation.  Many of the 
subsequent measures of religious belief are based on the Intrinsic-Extrinsic scale 
developed by Allport and Ross.  Extrinsic motivation for religious belief is characterized 
by the social factors related to religious belief, such as desire to belong to a group, to 
socialize and feel support.  Sample items include “A primary reason for my interest in 
religious is that my church is a congenial social activity” and “What religion offers me 
	  	  
 	   19 
most is comfort when sorrows and misfortune strike”.  Intrinsic motivation can be 
characterized by a more internal drive towards belief and what it provides for the 
individual, such as prayer and guidance.  Sample items include “I try to hard to carry my 
religion over into all my other dealings in life” and “Quite often I have been keenly aware 
of the presence of God or the Divine Being”.   The ROS has been tested for reliability in 
multiple contexts and populations since its inception in the 60’s (Hill & Hood, 1999; 
Maltby, 2002).   Internal consistency and test-retest reliability of the intrinsic and 
extrinsic subscales has generally been reported with Cronbach alphas in the .80s and .70s, 
respectively (Hill & Hood, 1999). 
 The Religious Orientation Scale, while influential, has multiple limitations that 
preclude it from practical use studying atheists.  The 20-item scale is influenced by a 
North American Christian background, with items that explicitly mention Church, the 
Bible, and other Christian dogmatic terminology.   This, and other items that begin with 
the presumption that the participant has a religious belief (as compared to irreligious) 
create difficulty for nonreligious individuals to answer the items accurately and 
consistently. 
 Hoge Intrinsic Motivation Scale.  Hoge’s (1972) Intrinsic Religious Motivation 
Scale is strongly influenced by the ROS, though it differs in that Hoge conceptualizes 
religious orientation on one dimension rather than two.  Thus, extrinsic and intrinsic 
religious motivation is seen as two ends of a unidimensional factor.  Some sample items 
include “My faith involves all of my life” and “Nothing is as important as serving God as 
best I know”. 
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The 10-item scale contains 7 intrinsic and 3 extrinsic items, with the extrinsic 
item scores reversed to put all items on the same dimension (Hill & Hood, 1999).  The 
scale was normed on a sample of adult Protestants who were referred to take the test 
based on perceived high levels of religiosity from their ministers (Hoge, 1972).  The 
internal reliability of the original sample was .90, using Kuder-Richardson.  The 
shortened form of the test yielded a Cronbach alpha of .84 (Hill & Hood, 1999).  Validity 
of the scale was tested by the relationship between ministers’ impressions of the 
individuals’ religiosity and test scores, which were correlated at .58 with p = .03 
significance-level (Hoge, 1972).  Additionally, test scores correlated with the ROS at  
.71. 
 The Intrinsic Religious Motivation Scale completely ignored nontheistic 
populations.  The sample population used in the development of the scale consisted only 
of Protestant adults who were highly religious, which limits both the variance that could 
be detected in the instrument, as well as its applicability to non-Christian populations.  
While explicit mention of God and Christian terminology is more minimal in comparison 
to the ROS, the assumption that an individual is theistic is implied. 
Duke University Religion Index.  The Duke University Religion Index 
(DUREL) is a brief, five-item measure of religious belief that is specifically designed for 
use in studies measuring health outcomes (Koenig & Büssing, 2010).  The DUREL is in 
part based on the Hoge’s Intrinsic Religious Motivation Scale, but instead contains three 
factors: organizational religious activity (ORA), non-organizational religious activity 
(NORA), and intrinsic religiosity (IR).  ORA is characterized by group and public 
religious activities such as church and study groups.  NORA represents private 
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expressions of religious belief such as private prayer and reading.  IR measures 
motivating factors for religious belief.  The purpose of this differentiation in factors from 
previous religious motivation scales was an attempt to more comprehensively measure 
religious belief (Hill& Hood, 1999).  
 The DUREL was developed by administering the Hoge Intrinsic Religious 
Motivations Scale to 455 inpatients at the Duke medical center (Koenig & Büssing, 
2010).  Scores were correlated to measures of depression, social support, and other well-
being constructs.  Principal component analysis led to selection of 3 items from the Hoge 
scale that loaded to the intrinsic religiosity factor (Hill & Hood, 1999).  Single items were 
utilized to measure both ORA and NORA.  The three items used for IR yielded a 
Cronbach’s alpha of .75, and since the other two factors only consisted of one item each, 
there was no analysis of internal consistency.   The 3-item IR subscale of the DUREL 
demonstrated high correlation with the 10-item Hoge scale (r = .85) and modest 
correlation with the ORA and NORA subscales (r = .40, r = .42, respectively), indicating 
convergent validity to the Hoge scale and differentiation of the factors (Hill & Hood, 
1999). 
Similar to other religious motivation scales, the IR component of the DUREL 
appears to be designed with the religious individual in mind, using terminology that 
might result in undifferentiated scores between nonreligious and strongly irreligious 
individuals.   This creates difficulties in use with atheistic populations, as there is no way 
to address how those beliefs are expressed. 
Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire.  The Santa Clara 
Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire (SCSORF) is a 10-item scale that is designed 
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to measure the strength of belief interdenominationally (Plante & Boccaccini, 1997).  The 
authors contend that religious orientation measures such as the ROS do not sufficiently 
measure the strength of religious beliefs.  The SCSORF is a unidimensional measure.  
Sample items include “My religious faith is extremely important to me” and “I look to 
my faith as providing meaning and purpose in my life.” 
The SCSORF was administered to three samples of college students, adults, and 
high school students, respectively.  High internal reliability coefficients were obtained for 
each sample, with Cronbach’s alpha above .90.  The scores of the three samples from the 
SCSORF were correlated at .87, .90, and .87 with The Age Universal Religious 
orientation Scale (a revision of the ROS by Gorsuch & Venable, 1983; see Hill & Hood, 
1999), suggesting high convergent validity. 
The scale, which is shorter than the ROS, does not contain explicit references to 
Christian terminology.  However, the word ‘faith’, which is used in most of the items, 
can be a confusing term for nonreligious individuals to respond to due to its religious 
connotations.  While the SCSORF is much more accessible of a scale for diverse 
respondents, it does not provide for items to differentiate between low religious 
individuals and atheists.  
Summary and Rationale for the Current Study 
Over the last 20 years, religion and spirituality have been well studied in regard to 
their intersection with counseling in order to better serve the needs of religious and 
spiritual clients.  Measures of religious motivation and orientation seek to assess an 
important construct in psychology (Koenig & Büssing, 2010).  A major criticism of these 
existing measures is that they presume a theistic belief system.  Such measures are biased 
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against atheists and any other individuals who do not believe in any God or higher power.  
Little research has been conducted to understand the experiences of atheists, who have 
historically been discriminated for their beliefs.  Atheists are one of the least trusted 
minorities in America and they may experience psychological distress as a result of social 
ostracism and demonizing from religious individuals (Gervais, Sharif,  & Norenzayan, 
2011).    
Numerous studies have revealed a positive correlation between religious belief 
and mental well-being, though the erroneous assumption is that nonbelief is necessarily 
harmful (McCullough, 1999; Morgan, 2013; Weber et al., 2012).  This may be due in part 
to the lack of empirical research explicitly studying atheism and mental health.   A major 
issue in the study of atheism and mental health is the insufficiency of available measures 
to adequately convey the belief system of atheists.  Since nontheists comprise a small 
minority of the population, rarely are they the focal sample of a study.   Measures of 
religious belief are typically normed to Protestant Christian populations, though efforts 
have been made to create inclusive measures for diverse religious beliefs (Hill & 
Pargament, 2003).   Brief measures of religious belief based on Allport & Ross’ (1967) 
Religious Orientation Inventory, as well as other commonly used measures fail to 
differentiate the various ways in which individuals may be nonreligious due to explicitly 
theistic terminology.  As a result, these measures fail to identify nonreligious individuals 
who may consider their nonbelief a major aspect of their worldview.  Since strength of 
belief is a factor in the relationship between religious belief and mental health, measures 
should incorporate language that can accurately assess this variable for both theistic and 
atheistic populations. 
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The purpose of this study is to create a brief strength of religious/nonreligious 
worldview scale that has language inclusive of nontheistic populations.   
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Method 
Overview 
 The development of the Strength of Worldview Scale (SOWS) was conducted in 
three phases.  In phase one, items for the scale were developed with assistance from an 
expert in research on atheists.   In phase two, the scale was field tested to determine 
validity of the instrument. In the third phase, a second sample was obtained to establish 
test-retest reliability of the measure. 
Phase I  
 Item Development.  The purpose of the SOWS is to create a more universal scale 
of religious/nonreligious belief that is applicable to both theists and atheists.  Based on 
analysis of existing measures of religious motivation, the construct of belief motivation 
should be represented in atheists as well as theists.  That is to say, atheists and other 
nontheists experience motivating forces towards their beliefs and can find strength in 
those beliefs (Smith, 2011).  However, existing scales do not attempt to measure the 
degree of atheistic belief in the same manner that theistic belief is measured.  Many items 
utilized in previous measures prevent meaningful application to nontheists; some items 
presume theistic belief and others use explicitly theistic terminology to quantify belief.  
Therefore, a fundamental concern in item selection is to ensure items are understandable 
and applicable to both atheists and theists.   The SOWS attempts to measure the construct 
of worldview belief strength. Strength of belief can be defined as the importance of a 
person’s beliefs to their life and identity, which based on existing literature, has been 
operationalized through scales of religious motivations (Allport & Ross, 1967; Smith, 
2011; Whitley, 2010).  In religious and theistic populations, the strength of an 
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individual’s belief is correlated with positive mental health, but the false assumption is 
made that nontheistic individuals have weak beliefs in their understanding of the world 
(Galen & Kloet, 2011).    
 In this study, the term “worldview” is used to describe the belief system of both 
theistic and atheistic individuals.  The term worldview already exists in academic 
literature, and has been defined as “…a set of assumptions about physical and social 
reality that shapes the way a person perceives and interprets the world… a sense of 
meaning to reality...” (Magee & Kalyanaraman, 2009).  The purpose of this study is to 
remove the theistic bias in strength of belief measures.  Thus, I am modifying items in 
religious belief measures by incorporating “worldview” concepts and language.  I created 
a subset of items from the Intrinsic Religious Motivation Scale (Hoge, 1972), Religious 
Orientation Scale (Allport & Ross, 1967), Duke University Religion Index (Koenig & 
Büssing, 1997), and the Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith questionnaire (Plante & 
Boccaccini, 1997) that fit with the construct of strength of worldview.   Items were 
selected for their applicability to atheists and other nontheistic belief systems.  I also 
refined the wording of items so that they are relevant and sensitive to both atheists and 
theists.  Alterations included: removing explicitly theistic or religious terminology, such 
as ‘God’, ‘the Bible’, ‘church’, etc.; using hyphenations of ‘belief/nonbelief’, 
‘religious/nonreligious belief/faith/worldview’, etc., when describing theistic and 
atheistic beliefs; and simply using the words belief or worldview in the items while 
explaining their applicability in the instructions.   Lastly, I included additional items that 
may better fit the construct of strength of worldview that are not addressed in existing 
measures.   
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After creating the preliminary items for the study, I contacted two experts in the 
field of atheist research and received feedback on the inclusion and wording of the items.  
Both experts are male PhD professors at major research institutions.  By email, I provided 
the experts with my collection of items, as well as an explanation of the construct being 
examined and a request for feedback on individual items (Appendix A; Appendix B).   I 
received feedback from one of the two experts and implemented the suggestions made for 
a few of the items.  Adjustments on the measure included revising of wording on four 
items with an emphasis on universality.  No recommendations were made to add, remove, 
or significantly alter any of the items.  After integrating the feedback from the expert, 
testing of the measure began. 
Phase II 
Participants.  For this phase of the study, the scale was administered to a 
convenience sample of 215 undergraduate and graduate students at Arizona State 
University and Miami University of Ohio.   Eight participants left a significant portion of 
the questionnaire blank and were excluded from the sample, resulting in a usable sample 
of 207.  The sample comprised of three subsets: undergraduate students taking a class in 
introductory psychology or career/major exploration, students who are on the listserv of 
secular student organizations, and students in graduate counseling psychology courses.  
Participants were given the option to complete the survey online through a link and 
offered the opportunity to receive extra credit (Appendix C).  The sample (N = 207) 
comprised of 47.5% male and 51.5% female.  Mean age of the sample was 20 with a 
range of 17-64 years.  The racial/ethnic background was as follows: 7.2% African 
American, 13.5% Asian, 66.7% Caucasian, 16.9% Latino/Hispanic, 1% Middle Eastern, 
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4.3% Native American/Indigenous, and 3.9% Other. Percentages may not add up to 100 
as participants had the option to select more than one racial category. Forty-three percent 
of the sample reported identifying as either agnostic, atheist, or religious none, while 48% 
reported being a member of a major religious group.  In terms of actual belief, 28% 
reported not believing in a God, Gods, or higher power, with 16% reporting as unsure, 
and 55% as believing.    
 Instrumentation.   The items developed in phase one were included in the study 
as the central measure (the SOWS), while five additional items were included to measure 
religious identity, religiosity, spirituality, theistic/atheistic belief, and gnostic/agnostic 
belief.  In order to test for convergent validity, participants also completed the Purpose in 
life subscale of the Ryff Scales of Psychological Well-Being (Ryff, 1989) and the 
Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1993).  To test for 
discriminant validity, participants completed the extraversion subscale of the Big Five 
Inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999).  
 Religiosity, Spirituality, and Theistic/Atheistic Belief.  Five questions were 
included to assess how individuals categorize their religious and spiritual beliefs, how 
religious they believed to be, how spiritual they believed to be, the degree to which they 
either believed or disbelieved in a God, Gods, or higher power (theistic/atheistic belief), 
and whether or not they believed it was possible to know for certain if a God, Gods, or 
higher power does or does not exist scale (gnosticism/agnosticism) (see Appendix A).  
Items assessing religiosity, spirituality, and theistic/atheistic belief were answered on a 
seven-point Likert-type scale.  Specifically, for theistic/atheistic belief, 1 indicated “I 
wholly believe in God, Gods, or a higher power”, 4 indicated “I am unsure whether a 
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God, Gods, or a higher power exists”, and 7 indicated “I wholly believe that there is no 
God, Gods, or a higher power”.   Gnosticism/agnosticism was answered on a three-point 
“yes, no, unsure” scale.  
 Ryff’s Purpse in Life Subscale.   The Ryff Scales measure six areas of well-being: 
Autonomy – self-determining, independent, self-regulating; Environmental Mastery – 
sense of control and effective use of external environment and opportunities; Personal 
Growth – feelings of continued development, realizing potential, sense of maturing; 
Positive Relations with Others – satisfying and trusting relationships, strong emotional 
intelligence; Purpose in Life – goals in life, sense of meaning; and Self-Acceptance – 
positive and realistic view of self, not judgmental towards oneself (Ryff & Keyes, 1995).   
Participants respond on a 6-point scale from completely disagree to completely agree. 
The original form contains 20 items for each scale and was tested on 321 individuals, 
with internal consistencies ranging from .86 to .92 (Ryff, 1989).  The Ryff scales have 
been cited in over 400 research articles and have had varying forms tested in multiple 
languages and countries (Springer & Hauser, 2006). In addition to the original 20-item 
subscale form, a 12, 9, and 3-item subscale forms have been validated (Springer & 
Hauser, 2006). For this study, only the Purpose in Life subscale from the 9-item per 
subscale form was included.  Internal consistency of the Purpose in Life 9-item subscale 
was computed to be .73.  Van Dierendonck (2004) found a correlation of .89 between the 
short form and the original 20-item subscale.   
 Depression, Anxiety, and Stress Scale.  This 42-item measure contains three 
subscales indicating an individual’s current levels of depression, anxiety, and stress.  
Internal consistencies for each subscale ranged from .84 to .91, and a three-factor model 
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was supported by a confirmatory factor analysis (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1993).  Support 
of convergent validity was demonstrated with high correlation (.74) of the depression 
subscale to the Beck Depression Inventory and high correlation (.81) of the anxiety 
subscale with the Beck Anxiety inventory (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1993). 
 Extraversion.  The Big Five Inventory (BFI) was created to be a shorter form of 
McCrae & Costa’s (1992) NEO PI-R, which contains the “Big 5” factors of personality – 
Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness (John & 
Srivastava, 1999).  The 44-item BFI is highly correlated with the full 240 item NEO PI-
R, with correlations for the factors ranging from .83 - .96.  The extraversion subscale of 
the BFI demonstrated an internal consistency of .88 and a strong correlation with the 
NEO (.83) (John & Srivastava, 1999).  The extraversion subset of the BFI was included 
to test for discriminant validity with the SOWS, as previous literature has not suggested 
differences in extraversion in relation to strength of belief (Hwang, Hammer & Cragun, 
2009).   
Recruitment.  Request for participation in the study was provided to students in 
introductory psychology classes as an opportunity for minimal extra credit.  Students in 
the secular organizations (Secular Student Alliance, Secular Free-Thought Society of 
ASU, and Secular Students of Miami) were recruited through their Facebook group and 
email listserv.  The study was conducted through use of Qualtrics; an online 
questionnaire program.   
 Analysis. Analysis of the SOWS included a brief group comparison based on 
demographic information, an exploratory factor analysis to determine if the factors differ 
from those found in measures of religious motivation, and regression and correlational 
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analyses to gain a better understanding of the theoretical underpinnings for strength of 
worldview belief.  
 After the eight participants who left the survey blank were excluded from 
analysis, any other missing data in the sample was accounted for in analyses by utilizing 
multiple imputation with 20 imputations and 200 iterations. 
Previous literature on strength of belief measures varies from one to three factors.  
The Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire (Plante & Boccaccini, 1997) 
contains one factor of strength of belief, the Hoge Intrinsic Religious Motivation Scale 
(Hoge, 1972) contains one factor of intrinsic motivation, the Religious Orientation Scale 
(Allport & Ross, 1967) contains two factors of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and the 
Duke University Religion Index (Koenig & Büssing, 2010) contains three factors: 
intrinsic motivation, organizational religious behavior, and non-organizational religious 
behavior.  It was hypothesized that a sole factor would emerge in the Strength of 
Worldview Scale.   
A regression analysis was conducted to understand the relationship between 
theism/atheism and strength of worldview.  It is predicted that theistic/atheistic belief will 
act as a predictor for scores on the SOWS.  Convergent and discriminant validity of the 
SOWS was tested through a correlational analysis with the Ryff scales, DASS and the 
BFI.  It was predicted that high scores on the SOWS would be correlated to high scores 
on the Purpose in Life subscale of the Ryff Scales of Psychological well-being.  
Additionally, the three subscales of the DASS should be negatively correlated with the 
SOWS.  It is hypothesized that scores on the SOWS will be unrelated to scores of 
Extraversion on the BFI.   
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Phase III 
Test-Retest Reliability.  For this phase of the study, the survey was administered 
to a sample (N = 20) of students in the Master’s and PhD Counseling Psychology 
program at Arizona State University, as well as undergraduate students at Purdue 
University Calumet.  The sample consisted of 13 males and 7 females with a median age 
of 23.9.  Eight identified as Caucasian, 4 as African American, 3 as Asian, 3 as 
Latino/Hispanic, 2 as Native American, 1 as Middle Eastern, and 1 as Other (Pacific 
Islander). Racial/ethnic counts will not add up to 20 as participants had the option to 
select more than one racial category. In terms of religious belief, 11 participants 
identified as Christian, 4 as Agnostic, 1 as Atheist, and 3 as Other (Spiritual, Baha’i, and 
Catholic).  Participants accessed the survey through a recruitment email distributed by the 
instructor.  Students were given the study twice by their instructors in a two week 
interval.  Each participant from this sample created a code at the initial assessment and 
was required to enter that code at the second assessment so that test and retest scores 
could be matched.  Pearson correlations were computed between scores at time 1 and 2.  
It was predicted that strength of worldview would be relatively stable and would not 
change on a short-term basis.  Retest administration two weeks later should be highly 
correlated with the original results.  
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Results 
Exploratory Factor Analysis 
An exploratory factor analysis was conducted on the preliminary 17-item Strength 
of Worldview measure.   Factors were extracted utilizing the principal axis factoring 
method in SPSS, with no rotation.  Eigenvalues lower than one were removed 
automatically in the analysis, and a subjective analysis of a scree plot was utilized to 
determine the optimal number of factors (See Figure 1).  The initial factor, “worldview 
strength”, had an eigenvalue of 9.61, explaining 56.55% of the variance in the model, 
while a second factor, “lack of worldview”, had an eigenvalue of 1.61, explaining 9.48% 
of the variance. All other components fell below the extraction threshold.  Due to a lack 
of theoretical relevance, and the fact that the three items that loaded to it were reverse 
coded, the second factor was excluded in further analysis. Those items that loaded onto 
the second factor (questions 5, 16, and 17) were excluded, making the SOWS a 14-item 
measure (See Table 1). 
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Figure 1. Scree Plot for the Strength of Worldview Scale
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Group Comparisons 
 Independent sample t-tests were conducted to explore if any differences existed in 
scores of the SOWS based on demographic information. No statistically significant 
differences were observed between males (M = 3.11, SD = 1.07) and females (M = 3.17, 
SD = 1.06), t(196) = -.39, p = .702, and a one-way ANOVA indicated no significant 
differences between racial groups, F(5, 184) = 1.50, p = .193.  Additionally, Theists (M = 
3.24, SD = 1.07) and nontheists (M = 2.93, SD = 1.00) did not differ significantly on 
average scores of the SOWS, t(205) = 1.89, p = .059.   
Regression Analysis 
 A regression analysis was conducted to investigate if the variable theistic/atheistic 
belief could predict worldview strength.  The full SOWS measure was the criterion 
variable in the analysis.  A linear and a quadratic regression model were compared for 
best fit of the data given previous literature suggesting that the relationship between 
theistic/atheistic belief and strength of belief may be linear (Koenig, McCullough, & 
Larson, 2001; McCullough, 1999) or possibly curvilinear (Galen & Kloet, 2011).  The 
linear model (R2 = .07, F(1,205) = 15.70, p < .05) and the curvilinear model (R2 = .14, 
F(1,204) = 14.90, p < .05) were statistically significant, though the curvilinear model was 
better able to explain the variance above and beyond a linear model (R2 Change = .07, 
F(1,204) = 17.31, p < .05) (See Figure 2).   This result indicates a modest effect size, with 
a curvilinear model of theistic/atheistic belief explaining 14% of the variance in strength 
of worldview, and 7% more of the variance than from a linear model.  Individuals who 
strongly believed God existed tended to have a stronger worldview belief than those who 
did not believe in God.  However, those who did not express a strong belief about the 
	  	  
 	   37 
existence or nonexistence of God had lower scores of strength of worldview than both 
those who strongly believed in God and those who strongly did not believe in God.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Linear vs Curvilinear Regression of Theistic/Atheistic Belief on the SOWS.  Y-
axis indicates average score on the SOWS.  Theistic/Atheistic Belief scale ranges from 1 
(I wholly believe there is no God, Gods, or higher power) to 4 (I am unsure of the 
existence of a God, Gods, or higher power) to 7 (I wholly believe there is a God, Gods, or 
higher power). 
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Correlational Analysis 
Correlations were computed on the Purpose in Life Subscale, DASS Subscales 
(depression, anxiety, stress), BFI Extraversion Subscale, and the SOWS (See Table 2).  
Results of the correlational analysis indicate that no correlations with the SOWS were 
significant.  
Table 2 
Correlations of DASS Subscales, Ryff Purpose in Life Subscale, BFI 
(Extraversion), and SOWS 
 
Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Depression -      
2. Anxiety .693* -     
3. Stress .739* .798* -    
4. Purpose in Life -.489* -.366* -.323* -   
5. Extraversion -.212* -.048 -.028 .265* -  
6. SOWS  -.065 .021 .052 .101 .058 - 
 
Note. * Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Test-Retest Analysis 
A test-retest analysis was run to estimate reliability of the SOWS, using the 14 
items that remained after the exploratory factor analysis.  Twenty participants took and 
retook the SOWS at a two-week interval.  Scores at Time 1 correlated highly with scores 
at Time 2 (r = .726 , p < .05), indicating adequate temporal consistency of the measure. 
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Discussion 
 The purpose of this study was to create a measure of the strength of an 
individual’s worldview irrespective of their theistic orientation.   Items were derived from 
theistically-biased measures, with the biased items revised.  Items were qualitatively 
improved with the help of an expert in the field.  A test-retest analysis indicated the new 
instrument was stable over time.   
The Exploratory Factor Analysis appears to support a one-factor solution.  While 
two potential factors passed the initial screening of eigenvalues greater than 1, 
“worldview strength” explained 57% of the variance while a potential second factor 
would have only accounted for 10% of the variance.  Only one item (question 5) did not 
load to “worldview strength”, and only three items (questions 5, 16, and 17) loaded more 
strongly onto the potential second factor.  Importantly, when I looked at the content of 
the items that loaded more strongly on the second factor, I found that they did not differ 
in any meaningful theoretical sense from the rest of the scale items. Interestingly, though, 
I did notice that they were the only reverse-scored items in the scale.  Perhaps, then, this 
second factor might represent the inattention of some of the participants in not 
recognizing the different wording of the reverse scored items.  On the basis of this 
observation, in addition to the relatively low eigenvalue for the second factor, I conclude 
that it is more appropriate to advance a one-factor model in developing this Strength of 
Worldview Scale, excluding the three items (questions 5, 16, and 17) that failed to load to 
the “worldview strength” scale.  A one-factor model was hypothesized and fits well 
within previous literature, especially from the measures that the SOWS was inspired 
(Hoge, 1972; Plante & Boccaccini, 1997).  While the “grandfather of religious orientation 
	  	  
 	   40 
scales” was two dimensional with extrinsic and intrinsic factors of religious belief 
(Allport & Ross, 1967), the Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire 
(SCSORF; Plante & Boccaccini, 1997) and the Intrinsic Religious Motivation Scale 
(Hoge, 1972) viewed intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity as multiple expressions of a single 
construct.  The SOWS is similar to the SCSORF in that it seeks to measure strength of 
belief rather than different expressions of belief, so it is logical that these two measures 
are comparable and would both have a single factor. 
In addition to developing a more inclusive way of testing one’s strength of 
worldview, this study also revealed some important insights regarding the relationship 
between religious/nonreligious beliefs and mental health.  While many studies have 
found a positive linear relationship between high religiosity and positive mental health 
outcomes (Koenig, McCullough, & Larson, 2001; McCullough, 1999; Okulicz-Kozaryn, 
2010; Plante, Yancey, Sherman, & Guertin, 2000; Weber et al, 2012), others suggest that 
the relationship between belief and mental health may in fact be curvilinear (Galen & 
Kloet, 2011, McMordie, 1981, Weber et al., 2012).  If such a curvilinear relationship 
exists, it would run against the unspoken assumption in the literature that less religiosity 
is associated with a weaker worldview.  Participants in the current study were asked to 
rate their “theistic/atheistic belief”, the degree to which they believe or disbelieve in the 
existence of God, with those beliefs acting as a predictor variable for strength of 
worldview.  A positive linear relationship was found, suggesting that theists tend to have 
stronger worldview beliefs than atheists.  However, a curvilinear relationship was able to 
better explain the relationship between the variables, suggesting that both theists and 
atheists have stronger worldviews compared to those who are agnostic or unsure.  This 
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finding gives credence to the hypothesis that nontheists can have strong belief systems in 
a similar manner as theists, and supports the SOWS as capable of assessing those beliefs 
in both theists and atheists.   
 The correlational analyses were conducted to test the validity of the SOWS.  
There were no significant correlations between the SOWS and other tested measures.  A 
correlation with Purpose in Life neared significance, however it fell just short. The 
prediction that scores on the SOWS would be negatively correlated with depression, 
anxiety, and stress was not supported.  Additionally, as hypothesized, there existed no 
correlation between the SOWS and extraversion.  In summary, validation of the SOWS 
may be viewed as weak.   
 Ideally the test-retest correlation would be higher due to the stability of a 
construct like strength of worldview, but the measured correlation is adequate for this 
study.  Given the relatively short timeframe of two weeks between Time 1 and Time 2, it 
was expected to have a test-retest coefficient of .80 or higher.  Still, a coefficient of .73 
indicates that participants did not greatly change in how they rated the strength of their 
worldview.   
Limitations 
 There were several methodological and theoretical limitations to this study. One 
limitation in the methodology of the research is that the data was mostly collected 
through convenience sampling.  Also, in order to get an adequate number of nontheistic 
participants, I targeted secular student organizations.  While this resulted in the inclusion 
of more nontheists, the recruitment could be considered biased.  For example, nontheists 
from these student organizations may be different from general population nontheists in 
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that they may be more likely to self-identify as atheist or agnostic, more likely to have a 
strong belief system (enough so to join an organization), and more likely to participate in 
the study (more interested in the topic).  Additionally, embracing atheism as an identity 
typically occurs during college age (Smith, 2011).  Thus, college students’ strength of 
belief may be different than older, more mature individuals.   
There was also no direct comparison made to any of the original measures of 
religious strength of belief that the SOWS items were created from.  A correlational 
analysis between the ‘parent’ and ‘child’ measures could have provided useful 
information about the validity of the SOWS.  Specifically a correlation between the 
SCSORF and the SOWS would have been helpful for establishing convergent validity 
since these scales are most similar.  Questions about participants’ specific behavior, like 
how many hours a week the participant has spent reading texts related to his/her beliefs, 
rather than his or her general impression of frequency, may have been preferable. 
In the regression analysis, a one-item measure was utilized to represent 
theistic/atheistic belief.  There are limitations to using a one-item measure for analysis, 
such as potentially low reliability and predictive validity (Diamatopoulos, Sarstedt, 
Fuchs, Wilczynski, & Kaiser, 2012).   
Another methodological limitation of the correlational analysis of the SOWS and 
the DASS is the difference in reference of time.  While the SOWS is asking for a 
reflection of a more longstanding assessment of belief, the DASS is measuring 
depression, anxiety, and stress levels reported in the last two weeks.  Given the long-term 
and more stable nature of the construct of worldview, it would make sense to compare it 
to a long-term measure of depression or a historical assessment of depression symptoms.  
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For example, some participants who may have a history of clinical depression but rated 
positive feelings in the last two weeks would have been scored as mentally healthy. 
One theoretical limitation of the current study is that there may be differences in 
the underlying structures of belief between theist and nontheist populations.  The SOWS 
items were adapted from measures of theistic religious belief, keeping a similar structure 
based on how those measures expressed religious belief.  If there was a unique effect of 
theistic-religious beliefs on positive mental health, then an attempt to measure nontheists 
beliefs with a questionnaire utilizing the assumption of a theistic-religious belief structure 
might be inadequate.  There may be fundamental differences in how theistic and atheistic 
individuals use their worldview beliefs.  
Another theoretical limitation may be that existing research exploring 
comparisons of theistic and atheistic beliefs focused on samples of older individuals.  A 
meta-analysis of 100 articles investigating atheists identified a mean sample age of 44 
across all studies (Brewster, Robinson, Sandil, Esposito, & Geiger, 2014).  This may 
limit the theoretical generalizability because older adults, both theistic and atheistic alike, 
might differ in the structures or their beliefs, or in the importance of belief in coping with 
life stressors, compared to the college aged individuals investigated in this study.  
Though not well explored, there may be many developmental differences that might 
influence the structure of beliefs between the elderly and college aged students. 
Future Research 
 Given the minority and discriminated status of atheists and other nonreligious 
individuals, there is a need to understand experiences of this population.  One potential 
direction for future research is an exploration of the impact and degree of discrimination 
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that nontheists face.  Research by D’Andrea and Sprenger (2007) and Brewster et al. 
(2014) highlight the societal need for greater understanding of this minimally studied 
population.  Previous studies by Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann (2006), Gervais, Shariff, 
and Norenzayan (2012), and Gervais and Norenzayan (2011) explored the type and scope 
of discrimination that atheists face, yet more research is needed on how that 
discrimination affects those individuals.  While we know that atheists are distrusted more 
than any other population in the US (Edgell, Gerteis & Hartmann, 2006) and that 41% of 
atheists reported experiencing discrimination for their beliefs (Hwang, Hammer, & 
Cragun, 2009), it is still not clear exactly how uniquely impactful this discrimination is 
on the mental health of atheists. 
Whereas the current study attempted to quantitatively measure the belief system 
of nontheists, qualitative methods could potentially lead to insight into the structures of 
nontheist belief and how nontheist beliefs might either help or hinder positive mental 
health.  Seventy-four percent of the current studies exploring atheism in counseling 
literature have been quantitative in nature (Brewster et al., 2014).  A qualitative study 
could help explain the similarities and differences between belief systems of theists and 
nontheists, such as if social support from similar-belief individuals has a comparable 
impact on atheists as it does for theists (Galen & Kloet, 2011).   
Conclusion 
Nontheists are a minimally studied minority population, and the current study has 
been an attempt at improving the instruments by which their beliefs can be studied.  The 
goal of creating a scale that can measure the strength of beliefs of nontheist as well as 
theist populations was partially achieved.  The Strength of Worldview Scale 
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demonstrated good test-retest reliability, though was not found to have any significant 
correlations with any measures assessing psychological well-being.   Additionally, 
theistic/atheistic belief was shown to predict worldview strength.   Further refinement of 
the measure is necessary, specifically with additional validity testing through correlations 
with a related measure such as the Santa Clara Strength of Religious Faith Questionnaire.  
Validity testing of the SOWS could also benefit from correlation with a more long-term 
measure of psychological well-being.  While the SOWS has clear limitations, the 
measure does show promise.  Researchers exploring religious or nonreligious worldview 
beliefs can utilize the SOWS as an alternative to current existing measures of strength of 
belief, especially when studying a nontheist population.  Given the need for sensitivity in 
counseling for diverse and minority populations, the SOWS can also be of use in clinical 
practice.  Practitioners could use the SOWS as an initial step in exploration of worldview 
beliefs to provide more integrated and personalized therapy for their clients, especially 
given the research supporting the	  value	  of incorporating clients’ beliefs into therapy 
(D’Andrea & Sprenger, 2007; Young, Wiggins-Fame, & Cashwell, 2007).  Future studies 
may further explore the relationship between the discrimination atheists face in 
connection with mental health outcomes as well as the structures of belief of nontheists.  
In line with social justice aims, additional focus on nontheist populations will ultimately 
serve the greater good for both research and practice of counseling. 
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APPENDIX A 
STUDY QUESTIONNAIRE 
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1. How would you identify your current religious beliefs? 
_Agnostic 
_Atheist 
_Buddhist 
_Christian 
_Hindu 
_Jewish 
_Muslim 
_None 
_Other (Please Specify) _________________ 
 
2. How religious do you feel you are? 
1 – not at all religious 
2 
3 
4 – somewhat religious 
5 
6 
7 – very religious 
 
3. How spiritual do you feel you are? 
1 – not at all spiritual 
2 
3 
4 – somewhat spiritual 
5 
6 
7 – very spiritual 
 
4. What is your belief on the existence of God, Gods or a higher power? 
1 – I wholly believe in God, Gods, or a higher power 
2 
3 
4 – I am unsure about the existence of God, Gods, or a higher power 
5 
6 
7 – I wholly believe that there is no God, Gods, or higher power 
 
5. Do you believe it is possible to know for sure whether or not god or a higher 
power exists? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Not sure 
 
The following items are focused on the concept of worldview. 
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“Worldview” refers to the beliefs people hold that help them understand the big questions 
in life: What is my purpose?  What happens after we die?  Why was the universe created?  
Why is there pain and suffering in the world?  These beliefs can be expressed though 
participation in organized religion, faith in a higher power, personal spirituality, 
philosophical reflection, scientific understanding, or in any number and degree of ways. 
 
Please refer to your own worldview as it relates to the definition just provided. 
 
Indicate to what degree you feel the following statements apply to you, where 1 is “not at 
all like me”, 3 is “somewhat like me” and 5 is “very much like me” 
 
 
1. I try to integrate my worldview into all of my life 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all like 
me 
 Somewhat like 
me 
 Very much like 
me 
 
2. My worldview is what really lies behind my whole approach to life. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all like 
me 
 Somewhat like 
me 
 Very much like 
me 
 
3. It is important to me to spend periods of time thinking about my worldview. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all like 
me 
 Somewhat like 
me 
 Very much like 
me 
 
4. I read literature (books, writings, scriptures) related to my worldview. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all like 
me 
 Somewhat like 
me 
 Very much like 
me 
 
 
 
 
5. There are more important things in life than my worldview (reverse scored) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all like 
me 
 Somewhat like 
me 
 Very much like 
me 
 
6. My worldview is a core part of who I am as a person. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all like 
me 
 Somewhat like 
me 
 Very much like 
me 
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7. It matters to me that I am identified by my worldview. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all like 
me 
 Somewhat like 
me 
 Very much like 
me 
 
8. Whenever possible, I try to integrate my worldview into all aspects of my life. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all like 
me 
 Somewhat like 
me 
 Very much like 
me 
 
9. My worldview greatly influences my decision-making. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all like 
me 
 Somewhat like 
me 
 Very much like 
me 
 
10. I look to my worldview as a source of inspiration. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all like 
me 
 Somewhat like 
me 
 Very much like 
me 
 
11. I enjoy being around others who share my worldview. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all like 
me 
 Somewhat like 
me 
 Very much like 
me 
 
12. I look to my worldview as a source of comfort. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all like 
me 
 Somewhat like 
me 
 Very much like 
me 
 
13. My worldview impacts many of my decisions. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all like 
me 
 Somewhat like 
me 
 Very much like 
me 
 
14. I seek out people with a shared worldview. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all like 
me 
 Somewhat like 
me 
 Very much like 
me 
 
15. My career and occupational choices are influenced by my worldview 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all like 
me 
 Somewhat like 
me 
 Very much like 
me 
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16. I do not think about my worldview when making decisions (reverse scored) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all like 
me 
 Somewhat like 
me 
 Very much like 
me 
 
17. My worldview is not very important in the grand scheme of things (reverse 
scored) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Not at all like 
me 
 Somewhat like 
me 
 Very much like 
me 
 
 
Demographic Information 
 
How old are you?   ___ years old 
What is your gender?   __ Female    __ Male   __ Other_____________(Please Specify) 
What is your racial/ethnic background? (Choose all that apply) 
__African American/Black 
__Asian 
__Caucasian/White 
__Latino/Hispanic 
__Middle Eastern 
__Native American/Indigenous 
__Other_____________(Please Specify) 
 
What is your yearly gross income?  _______ dollars per year 
 
What is your highest educational level achieved? 
__Less than a high school diploma 
__High school diploma 
__Some college/university 
__Associates degree 
__Bachelors degree 
__Some graduate school 
__Masters degree 
__Professional and/or doctorate degree (MD, JD, PHD, etc.) 
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APPENDIX B 
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXPERTS 
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Thank you so much for agreeing to help me with the construction of my measure!  The 
goal is to get some feedback on items and item wording for a scale to measure strength of 
a theistic and/or nontheistic worldview.   
 
Strength of worldview is the importance of a person’s beliefs to their life and identity, 
which based on existing literature, has been operationalized through scales of religious 
motivations (Allport & Ross, 1967; Smith, 2011; Whitley, 2010).  In religious and 
theistic populations, the strength of an individual’s belief is correlated with positive 
mental health (Galen & Kloet, 2011).    
 
I am attempting to create a measure of strength of worldview that has items primarily 
taken from or inspired by existing religious motivation measures.  These existing 
measures contain wording that is explicitly theistic, or otherwise presumes a theistic 
belief system.  This measure will hopefully measure the degree to which people find their 
belief system is important and central to themselves, regardless of whether or not they 
believe in a God, Gods, or higher power. 
 
I would appreciate your help in the following ways: 
1. Make suggestions for wording changes on any of the items 
2. Recommend removal or any items 
3. Recommend any items or item types to add 
 
Any other suggestions or guidance would be greatly appreciated.  I am available by 
phone or email at any time if you have questions or need any clarification. 
 
Joseph.robele@gmail.com 
915-342-0853 
 
Thank you much for your expert recommendations, 
 
Joseph Robele 
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APPENDIX C 
 
LETTER OF CONSENT 
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Title of research study: Development of a Theistic-Atheistic Strength of Worldview 
Scale   
Investigator: Joseph Robele 
Why am I being invited to take part in a research study? 
We invite you to take part in a research study because I am required to complete a 
research project and thesis as a requirement for completing my Master’s Degree at ASU.  
I am conducting my study under the guidance of Richard Kinnier, PhD.  I am looking for 
adult college undergraduate students (18 or older) to participate, and while there are no 
other qualifications to participate, I am greatly in need of nontheistic (atheist, agnostic) 
individuals to participate. 
Why is this research being done? 
The purpose of this study is to measure the strength and centrality of a person’s religious 
or nonreligious worldview.  Participation will involve completing a short survey online.  
How long will the research last? 
I expect that individuals will spend less than 20 minutes completing the survey. 
How many people will be studied? 
I expect about 200 people will participate in this research study. 
What happens if I say yes, I want to be in this research? 
You are free to decide whether you wish to participate in this study.  Your participation is 
voluntary, and your participation in this study will be kept confidential.  
What happens if I say yes, but I change my mind later? 
You can leave the research at any time it will not be held against you. 
What happens to the information collected for the research? 
Utmost care will be given to ensure the confidentiality of your answers.  Individual 
responses will not be reported; only aggregate results of all participants will be reported. 
Your answers will be given a code number so that answers can be referenced without 
violating confidentiality. 
Who can I talk to? 
If you have questions, concerns, or complaints, please contact me at 
joseph.robele@asu.edu.  You may also contact Richard Kinner, PhD, the Thesis Chair for 
the project at kinnier@asu.edu.  
This research has been reviewed and approved by the Social Behavioral IRB. You may 
talk to them at (480) 965-6788 or by email at research.integrity@asu.edu if: 
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● Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the research 
team. 
● You cannot reach the research team. 
● You want to talk to someone besides the research team. 
● You have questions about your rights as a research participant. 
● You want to get information or provide input about this research. 
 
 
Please select “I have read the form above and consent to participate” in order to continue 
with the study. If you choose not to continue you can select “cancel” or close your 
browser. 
 
Thank you for your time, 
 
Joseph Robele, B.A.  
 
